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1 Introduction 
Comparisons between nations have long had a central place in discussions of economic 
and social development and, more recently, of environmental performance. Because 
cities or urban systems have such importance for economic growth, social development, 
governance, and environmental performance, so the comparisons between nations’ 
urban populations or city populations, or their population growth rates have been 
common. There is also an interest in assessing progress in development among urban 
and rural populations, and this includes levels of poverty and provision for services (as 
in assessing, for instance, progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)). Since 1992, there has been a growing interest in comparing cities’ ecological 
footprints (Rees 1992) and, more recently, in comparing cities’ contributions to 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Dodman 2009). There are also many attempts 
to compare nations in regard to relationships between urban change and economic 
change. 
The temptation to undertake such comparisons is much magnified by the ease with 
which large urban population datasets can be acquired. For instance, it is very 
straightforward to access and use the datasets showing each nation’s urban population 
and level of urbanization, and each major city’s population from 1950 to 2005 with 
projections to 2030 and beyond. Almost everyone who writes about urban issues in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America draws directly or indirectly on the urban and rural 
population statistics produced by the United Nations Population Division – usually from 
the World Urbanization Prospects reports that they have published every two to three 
years since 1975. Each successive report incorporates the new census data that have 
become available since the previous report. Most of these reports (and all those 
published in the last 15 years) contain details of each nation’s urban definition (which 
shows how much these vary) and of the censuses (often limited in number) used for the 
figures for each nation and for each city. All these reports also give cautions to the 
reader with regard to comparing urban population statistics between nations because of 
the different official criteria for defining urban centres or setting city boundaries. These 
should serve as a caution to those who use the statistics, but they are almost always 
ignored. 
Some of these urban statistics are also included in World Development Indicators 
Online. From here, it is easy to download urban and rural population statistics for all the 
world’s countries, along with data for these same countries for several hundred other 
indicators. So, it is easy to compare, for instance, how nations’ urbanization levels vary 
with economic or labour force characteristics, how well the urban and rural populations 
of every country are served with water and sanitation, or what proportion of these 
populations are ‘poor’. Similarly, one can compare urban primacy levels between 
nations, which serve as the basis for discussing what social, economic or political 
factors account for high levels of primacy. However, no account is taken of the 
differences in how urban populations are defined and the lack of census data for many 
nations.   2
2  Urban definitions and their impact on urbanization statistics 
The urbanization level for any nation is the proportion of the national population living 
in urban centres, and so it is influenced by how the national government defines what is 
an ‘urban centre’. For instance, Mexico can be said to be either 74 or 67 per cent urban 
in 2000, depending on whether urban centres are all settlements with 2,500 or more 
inhabitants or all settlements with 15,000 or more inhabitants (Garza 2002). China’s 
level of urbanization in 1999 could have been 24 per cent, 31 per cent or 73 per cent, 
depending on which of three official definitions of urban populations was used (Liu et 
al. 2003; Zhang 2004). India appears to be a predominantly rural nation, but most of 
India’s rural population lives in settlements with between 500 and 5,000 inhabitants, 
which are considered as villages and therefore classified as rural; many more live in 
settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants, which are still classified as rural (Visaria 
1997). If these were classified as ‘urban’ (as they would be by some national urban 
definitions), India would suddenly have a predominantly urban population. 
In virtually all nations, official definitions ensure that the urban population includes all 
settlements with 20,000 or more inhabitants, but governments differ regarding what 
smaller settlements they include as urban centres – from those that include as urban all 
settlements with a few hundred inhabitants, to those that include only settlements with 
20,000 or more inhabitants. This limits the accuracy of international comparisons of 
urbanization levels because most nations have a large part of their populations living in 
settlements with between a few hundred and 20,000 inhabitants. For instance, in 1996, 
18 per cent of Egypt’s population lived in settlements with between 10,000 and 20,000 
inhabitants that had many urban characteristics, including significant non-agricultural 
economies and occupational structures. These were not classified as urban areas – 
although they would have been in most other nations. If they were considered urban, 
this would mean that Egypt was much more urbanized, causing major changes to urban 
growth rates (Denis and Bayat 2002).
1 In Pakistan, in 1998, a considerable proportion of 
the rural population lived in over a thousand settlements with more than 5,000 
inhabitants. However, these would have been counted as urban in the 1972 census – and 
Pakistan’s level of urbanization in 1998 would have been much higher had these been 
included (Hasan 2006). In Mauritius, in the 2000 census, around a quarter of the 
population lived in settlements with between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. These 
settlements included various district capitals that were not classified as urban areas.
2 If 
they had been classified as urban, the Mauritian population would have been more than 
two thirds urban in 2000, rather than less than half urban. 
Thus, the scale of the world’s urban population is strongly influenced by the urban 
criteria used within the largest population nations. If the Indian or Chinese government 
chose to change the urban criteria in their censuses, this could increase or decrease the 
world’s level of urbanization by several percentage points – and there are good reasons 
for thinking that the current criteria used in China and India considerably understate the 
size of the urban population. Revisions, for instance, by the Nigerian or Brazilian census 
                                                 
1 Another indication that Egypt’s urban definition understates its urban population is the fact that, by 
1996, two thirds of the labour force worked in industry and services although officially only 43 per cent 
of the population lived in urban areas. 
2 http://www.clgf.org.uk/2005updates/Mauritius.pdf; http://www.citypopulation.de/   3
authorities could significantly alter the level of urbanization in Africa or South America. 
In some nations, revisions in their urban definitions are responsible for part of the 
changes in their urban growth rates and levels of urbanization. Thus, the world’s level 
of urbanization is best understood not as a precise figure (50 per cent in 2008) but as 
being between 45 and 55 per cent, depending on the criteria used to define urban areas. 
It might be that the much-discussed transition to more than half the world’s population 
living in urban areas actually took place some years ago, with its recognition delayed by 
various governments deliberately understating their urban populations by classifying 
most small urban centres as rural. 
3 City  boundaries 
There are comparable problems with comparisons between cities for their populations 
or population growth rates when statistics for one city are for its central area (excluding 
most or all suburbs, and much smaller than the built-up area) and for another are for an 
extended metropolitan area. City boundaries are not set according to universally agreed 
criteria but according to local and national criteria, and these differ from nation to 
nation. In addition, most large cities have at least three different figures for their 
populations. These figures depend on whether it is the city, the metropolitan area or a 
wider planning (or administrative) region that is being considered, or whether the city 
population includes the inhabitants of nearby settlements with a high proportion of daily 
commuters. The current population of most of the world’s largest urban areas can vary 
by many million inhabitants, depending on which boundaries are used. 
In 2000, the population of New York City was 8 million; for the New York 
metropolitan area, the figure was 9.3 million; for the New York–Northern New Jersey–
Long Island consolidated metropolitan statistical area, 21.2 million (US Census Bureau 
online): all these figures are valid population statistics for ‘New York’. In 2000, Manila 
could be said to have 1.6 million inhabitants (the population of the city) or 9.9 million 
(the population of the national capital region). The populations of Bangkok, Beijing, 
Cairo, Dhaka, Jakarta, London, Mexico City, and Mumbai in 2000 can vary by several 
million, depending on whether the figure is for the city, the larger ‘urban 
agglomeration’, or the city-region (Satterthwaite 2007). 
The population figures usually given for the largest Chinese cities are actually for the 
populations in large local government areas that include significant proportions of 
people living in rural areas and working in forestry and agriculture. This confusion 
between local government area and city area explains why the city of Chongqing 
sometimes appears as the world’s largest or second largest city, with a population of 30 
million. However, this is the population in the municipality, which covers 82,400 square 
kilometres (about the size of Austria or the Netherlands and Denmark combined): the 
city population in 2000 was around 6 million. 
There are also many major cities that are within clusters of other cities and smaller 
centres that are outside their metropolitan boundaries, and these clusters might be 
considered as single urban agglomerations. China has several urban clusters; for 
instance, the Pearl River Delta urban cluster (which includes Hong Kong, Guangzhou, 
and Shenzhen), if considered as a single metropolitan area, would be among the world’s   4
largest cities (Chu 1996; Lo and Yeung 1996). Germany has many clusters; this 
explains the many different ways in which its large city populations are classified: the 
Rhine-Ruhr mega-city region had 11.7 million inhabitants in 2000 and included Essen, 
Dusseldorf, Cologne, and Bonn (Knapp et al. 2006). Mexico City can be considered at 
the core of a Central Mexico megalopolis with some 25 million inhabitants (Garza 
2002). Some of these clusters of cities cross national boundaries; for example, Tijuana–
San Diego in Mexico and the USA; and Singapore–Johore–Riau in Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia (Macleod and McGee 1996). 
Some cities have boundaries that greatly understate their real populations because they 
do not include large, dense settlements that have developed outside the official city 
boundaries. For instance, the population of Colombo in Sri Lanka is often given as 
around 642,000, but this was the population in 2001 in ‘Colombo municipal council’; 
the urban agglomeration of which this municipal council is at the centre has a much 
larger population (and Colombo District’s urban population was 1.2 million in 2001).
3 
Different boundaries also mean different population growth rates: for example, London, 
Los Angeles, Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and many other cities, can correctly 
be stated as having had declining or expanding populations in recent decades, 
depending on which boundaries are used.
4 In addition, large increases in a city’s 
population between two censuses are often partly due to an expansion of boundaries that 
suddenly incorporates many settlements not included as part of the city in the previous 
census. For instance, this in part explains the rapid growth in Dhaka and some other 
cities in Bangladesh during the 1980s and early 1990s. In South Africa, some of the 
large increase in the urban population shown by the 1996 census was due to the 
inclusion in 1996 of the African urban population living in the ‘independent’ states 
created by the apartheid regime, which population had been excluded from censuses in 
1980 and 1991 (Crankshaw and Parnell 2002). Statistics used to judge the 
environmental performance of large cities – as in, say, their freshwater consumption, 
ecological footprint or greenhouse gas emissions per person – are also greatly 
influenced by whether the boundary is for the central city, the built-up area or a larger 
metropolitan region. 
4  Lack of census data 
Accurate statistics for a nation’s urban population, or for the population in different 
urban centres, depend on accurate censuses.
5 However, in most nations, censuses are 
taken only every ten years and, in many nations, no census data are available for the last 
15 years. When no census data are available, the United Nations Population Division 
relies on estimates and projections – both for the urban and rural populations of nations 
                                                 
3 These are drawn from official statistics; see 
www.statistics.gov.lk/census2001/population/district/t002a.htm 
4 For a discussion of the different population growth rates of major Asian cities, depending on which 
boundaries are used, see Jones (2004); other chapters in this volume also discuss this for other nations and 
regions. 
5 There might be some exceptions to this for certain high-income nations, drawn from alternative official 
information sources.   5
(and hence their level of urbanization and the rate at which this is changing), and for the 
populations of major cities. For many nations, all their urban and city population 
statistics for 2000 or 2005 or 2010 are based on projections made from data from 
censuses held 10–20 years ago. 
Even in the latest United Nations urban statistical compendium, published in 2008, there 
is no census data since 1993 for over 30 nations; for more than 10 countries, there is no 
census data since 1981. Many nations have had only one, two, or three censuses since 
the late 1940s. So, for these nations, most of their urban statistics are based on 
projecting census data available for only one, two or three dates backwards and 
forwards in order to obtain the coverage from 1950 to the present (sometimes assisted 
by government estimates, the accuracy of which is in doubt). 
The lack of recent census data is particularly notable in sub-Saharan Africa – in part, 
because censuses are seen as expensive, and international donors have been reluctant to 
support them. This means, however, that urban population statistics for many sub-
Saharan African nations for 2000 or 2005 are based on projections from census data, 
with the most recent census being in the 1980s or early 1990s. For many such nations, 
urban trends might have changed dramatically since the 1980s, as the economic, 
political, and demographic factors underpinning urban population growth or rural–urban 
migration changed. However, this will not be apparent in their urban population 
statistics, since these are based on projections from urban trends in earlier decades. 
5  The generation of myths  
It is rare to find international analyses of urban change and economic change that 
recognize the limitations in the urban data, especially the lack of censuses and the limits 
to the comparability of many urban statistics. 
5.1  Is Africa well on the way to European levels of urbanization? 
The World Bank and various other commentators have claimed that sub-Saharan Africa 
was unusual because it urbanized rapidly without economic growth during the 1990s 
(World Bank 1999; Fay and Opal 2000). However, this claim was not based on any 
census data for urban populations for 2000 but, rather, on figures derived from 
projections from urban trends in the 1970s and 1980s. No reliable urban population data 
were available for 2000, when the World Bank published this claim. Even today, there 
are no reliable urban population data for many nations for 2000. There are also 
indications that much of sub-Saharan Africa is less urbanized than the projections 
suggested and that increases in levels of urbanization are slow or stagnating in many 
nations in the region (Potts 2006, 2009). In addition, the nations that had the largest 
increase in their level of urbanization are generally those with the best economic 
performance (therefore, sub-Saharan Africa is not urbanizing rapidly without economic 
growth). 
Africa is the fastest urbanizing continent in the world – around twice as 
fast as Latin America and Asia. In 25 years half the entire population will   6
live in cities. Africa is well on the way to European levels of 
urbanization – but without the economic base to sustain it (Commission 
for Africa 2005: 50). 
This quote from the 2005 Commission for Africa report is one among many possible 
examples of claims that Africa is urbanizing far more rapidly than anywhere else. The 
report, as many others, also claims that Africa has urbanized at rates that are historically 
unprecedented. In the above quote, there are at least two major errors and one very 
dubious prediction. If Africa is the most rapidly urbanizing continent in the world – 
around twice as fast as Latin America and Asia – this implies that the rate of increase in 
Africa’s level of urbanization is twice that of Asia and Latin America. This is not the 
case: according to the most recent UN dataset for the last decade for which census data 
are available for most nations (the 1990s), Asia’s rate of increase in its level of 
urbanization was more rapid than that of Africa. Latin America had a much lower rate 
of increase – but this is hardly surprising as Latin America already had more than three 
quarters of its population in urban areas. 
Perhaps the Commission for Africa report meant that Africa’s urban population growth 
rate, rather the rate of increase in the level of urbanization, was twice that of Latin 
America and Asia; however, this is also not the case. Africa is certainly not ‘well on the 
way to European levels of urbanization’: the most recent UN statistics suggest that 36 
per cent of Africa’s population lived in urban areas in 2000 compared with 71 per cent 
for Europe. With regard to whether Africa has urbanized at rates that are historically 
unprecedented, this is unlikely. For trends over several decades, available data do not 
show this; for instance, the rates of increase in the levels of urbanization in Asia and in 
Africa are fairly similar between 1950 and 2000 (although Africa had the faster rate for 
the first half of this period, Asia having the faster rate for the second half). Perhaps 
certain African nations urbanized at rates that were unprecedented for particular 
decades. However, if this were the case, it was largely because they were under-
urbanized due to the colonial political controls on urban growth and on the rights of 
Africans to live and work in urban areas. Rapid increases in urbanization levels resulted 
when these controls were weakened or removed. For the period 1980 to 2000, UN 
statistics suggest that several African nations had among the world’s smallest increases 
in their levels of urbanization (including Zambia and Egypt, which are reported to have 
de-urbanized). Potts (2009) points to a number of nations in sub-Saharan Africa with 
very slow or no increase in their level of urbanization for the most recent inter-census 
period. However, as noted above, some caution is needed in making generalizations for 
sub-Saharan Africa as no recent census data are available for many nations; also, for 
some of these nations, their small increase in level of urbanization (and, for Egypt, de-
urbanization) could be the result of urban definitions excluding smaller urban centres, 
many of which have rapidly growing populations. 
To support the claim that Africa has urbanized at rates that were ‘unprecedented’ would 
require some investigation of other nations that had periods of rapid urbanization – for 
instance, China from around 1980 to the present, many Latin American nations during 
periods of rapid industrialization and economic success (some of which predate 1950), 
or Japan for the decade or two after it industrialized so rapidly. During the 1970s, it was 
common to see inaccurate assertions that Latin America was the region with   7
unprecedented rates of urbanization. Perhaps now we are moving to an era where these 
inaccurate assertions will be applied to Asia.
6 
5.2  Is urban growth in Africa, Asia, and Latin America explosive, unprecedented 
and out of control?  
For over 30 years, it has been common to see statements about the ‘explosive growth’ of 
cities or the ‘urban explosion’ in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, often with comments 
that it is ‘out of control’. However, there is a strong economic logic with regard to 
where rapid urbanization has taken place and where large cities have developed. The 
increasingly urbanized population has been driven by the growing concentration of new 
investment and employment opportunities in urban areas. Within most nations, the main 
driver of urban change in recent decades is best summarized as the geography of where 
private enterprises choose to concentrate (or to avoid). Obviously, many other factors 
also influence urban change – for instance, the competence and accountability of city 
and municipal governments, the structure of national governments (especially the 
division of responsibilities, funding and fund-raising powers between different levels of 
government), and (often rapidly changing) demographic structures. Political change 
certainly shaped urban systems and trends for most nations in Africa and Asia, 
especially in the periods immediately prior to and after achieving political 
independence. In recent decades, however, economic change seems to be the dominant 
driver of urbanization in most nations, as shown by: 
•  The high concentration of urban population and largest cities in the world’s 
largest economies; 
•  The strong association between a nation’s per capita income and its level of 
urbanization; 
•  How increases in levels of urbanization for most low- and middle-income 
nations over the last 50 years track increases in the proportion of GDP generated 
by industry and services, and the proportion of the labour force working in these 
sectors (Satterthwaite 2007); 
•  The evidence that it is generally those nations with the most rapid economic 
growth that have urbanized most, and those with the poorest economic 
performance that have urbanized least. 
In the period from 1950 to 2000, many low-income nations, including some in Africa, 
had less absolute increase in their urbanization levels than the United States and 
Switzerland – although the rate of increase in their level of urbanization was generally 
much higher, largely because they began from such a low base. Even with aggregate 
figures, the increase in levels of urbanization for Africa (or sub-Saharan Africa) is not 
unprecedented. Africa’s level of urbanization increased from 15 to 36 per cent between 
1950 and 2000; the corresponding increase for sub-Saharan Africa was from 11 to 33 
per cent. For Europe, this figure rose from 51 to 71 per cent, and in Eastern Europe from 
                                                 
6 The Deputy Director General of the Asian Development Bank recently stated that ‘The rate of 
urbanization that Asia is experiencing is a phenomenon that is unprecedented in human history’: 
http://www.adb.org/media/Articles/2007/11618-asian-urban-crisis-solutions/   8
40 to 68 per cent. There are also many historical precedents of what are, today, high-
income nations with larger increases in their levels of urbanization over short periods 
than most of those taking place in recent decades in low- and middle-income nations. 
The change in the level of urbanization in low- and middle-income nations between 
1950 and 1975 was comparable to that in Europe and North America between 1875 and 
1900 (Graumann 1977; Preston 1979). The rates of net rural to urban migration required 
to achieve these increases might have been greater in Europe and North America in the 
late nineteenth century than in low- and middle-income nations from 1950 to 1975 
because the rates of natural increase in rural areas were probably higher than those in 
urban areas at that time (Davis 1973). 
5.3  Do cities in low- and middle-income nations have unprecedented population 
growth rates?  
Most of the world’s fastest-growing cities are in low- and middle-income nations, but 
there are important exceptions; for instance, Las Vegas, Phoenix-Mesa, and Orlando in 
the USA were among the world’s most rapidly growing large cities for the period 1950–
2000. In addition, the population growth rates for rapidly growing cities in low- and 
middle-income nations in recent decades are rarely unprecedented, as is shown in Table 
1. In Table 1 cities are grouped so that they have broadly comparable population sizes at 
the beginning of the period, except in the fourth grouping. In the fourth group, when 
viewing population growth over the twentieth century, the growth of Tokyo, Seoul, and 
Los Angeles (all in high-income nations) is comparable to that of Dhaka, Karachi, and 
Kolkata (previously Calcutta), three cities often held up as particularly fast growing 
cities, although for Kolkata population growth rate has dropped greatly in recent 
decades. The population of Los Angeles was around one tenth that of Kolkata in 1900, 
yet in 2000, it had about the same number of people in its metropolitan area. Dhaka is 
certainly one of the world’s fastest-growing large cities over the last few decades, 
although Los Angeles and Dhaka had populations of comparable size in 1900 and in 
2000. 
If there were a complete record of population growth rates for all major cities by decade 
over the last 200 years, it is likely that, during one or more decade since 1950, many of 
the most rapid population growth rates would have been in cities in low- and middle-
income nations. Many would be capitals of sub-Saharan African nations, although, as 
previously noted, this in part would be as apartheid-like controls on people’s movement 
were removed. But few, if any, would be ‘unprecedented’: for instance, in comparison 
with many Southern US cities that have grown so rapidly since 1900 (including some in 
Table 1); or Chicago or Pittsburgh in the second half of the nineteenth century; or 
Vancouver, Detroit, and some Australian cities for particular decades during the 
twentieth century. This point has importance because ‘unprecedented’ urban growth is 
so often given as a reason for the very severe urban problems facing most low- and 
many middle-income nations. If their urban growth is not unprecedented, the reasons for 
these problems must be reconsidered. 
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Table 1: Comparisons of cities’ population growth rates over 50- and 100- year periods 
 Population         








per yr (‘000) 
Tokyo 1874  596  1925 5,300    51  4.4  92 
New York  1850  516  1900 4,300    50  4.3  76 
Bangalore 1950  746  2000 5,567    50  4.1  96 
Atlanta 1950  513  2000 3,542    50  3.9  61 
Addis Ababa  1950  392  2000 2,493    50  3.8  42 
              
Los Angeles  1900  102  1950 4,046    50  7.6  79 
Nairobi 1950  137  2000 2,233    50  5.7  42 
Athens 1900  129  1950 1,783    50  5.4  33 
Phoenix-Mesa 1950  221  2000 2,934    50  5.3  54 
              
Chicago 1850  30  1900 1,717    50  8.4  34 
Abidjan 1950  65  2000 3,032    50  8.0  59 
Las Vegas  1950  35  2000 1,335    50  7.6  26 
Dar es Salaam  1950  67  2000 2,116    50  7.1  41 
Ouagadougou 1950  33  2000 828    50  6.7  16 
Dallas-Fort Worth  1900  43  1950 866    50  6.2  16 
Orlando 1950  75  2000 1,165    50  5.6  22 
Douala 1950  95  2000 1,432    50  5.6  27 
Bamako 1950  89  2000 1,110    50  5.2  20 
              
Miami 1900  2  2000 4,946    100  8.1  49 
Los Angeles- 
Long Beach-Santa Ana 
1900 102  2000 11,814 
 
100 4.9  117 
Dhaka 1900  90  2000 10,285    100  4.9  102 
Karachi 1900  136  2000 10,019    100  4.4  99 






100 3.2  330 





100 2.5  120 
Source: UN (2008) and Chandler (1987: 656). 
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Perhaps one important shift that has taken place is that from major cities being 
concentrated in the world’s most prosperous economies to major cities concentrated in 
the world’s largest economies. Historically, perhaps it has tended to be nations with the 
highest per capita incomes that have had the largest cities. Now, it is more common for 
large cities to be in the largest economies, which include large population nations that 
do not have high average per capita incomes. 
5.4  Primacy and urban bias 
There is a long history of researchers, politicians, and civil servants making normative 
judgements about urban areas or particular cities having too many people or too much 
public investment, or of urban populations being privileged over rural populations in 
some other way by the policies or expenditures of governments and international 
agencies. Part of this can be seen in discussions of ‘over-urbanization’, ‘premature’ 
urbanization, and urban primacy, and part in discussions of urban bias. There are 
certainly vigorous debates on these issues – to the point where some claim that urban 
bias has been a major reason for the scale and depth of poverty worldwide, while others 
claim that the economic performance of many low-income nations has been greatly 
hampered by the lack of attention by governments and international agencies to 
efficient, well-governed, ‘investment-attracting’ cities and urban systems.
7 
One manifestation of urban bias would be a high proportion of the population living in 
urban areas relative to the nation’s per capita income. Another manifestation of urban 
bias (or, perhaps more accurately, ‘largest-city’ bias) might be a high proportion of a 
nation’s urban population in its largest city (urban primacy). But do the data exist to 
allow such judgements? First, there are uncertainties in the accuracy of the basic data 
about many nations’ levels of urbanization because of a lack of census data for the last 
20 years. For the many nations with three or fewer censuses since 1950 (including some 
with none or only one), this seems a rather limited basis for analysing how rapidly they 
urbanized over five or six decades. Second, there are differences in the criteria used by 
governments to define urban populations, which, as already discussed, greatly limit the 
validity of international comparisons. If a nation’s level of urbanization can increase or 
decrease by as much as 10–20 per cent, depending on what criteria are chosen to define 
urban populations, this greatly limits the validity of international comparisons. 
Because primacy is generally measured by calculating the proportion of a nation’s urban 
population in its largest city, the validity of international comparisons depends on 
nations having comparable definitions for their urban populations (which is not the 
case), and similar ways of defining the physical boundaries of the largest city (which is 
also not the case). In many nations, the level of primacy can depend on which boundary 
is chosen for the largest city. As previously noted, large cities or metropolitan areas 
often have two, three or four different populations, depending on which boundary is 
chosen. Colombo’s primacy, for example, is much influenced by which boundary is 
used for Colombo (that is, did it have around 640,000 or 1.1 million inhabitants around 
2000) and which urban definition is used for Sri Lanka (was Sri Lanka 15 per cent or 48 
per cent urban in 2005?) (Indrasiri 2006). 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, World Bank (2008).   11
Perhaps the literature on primacy has exaggerated the extent of primacy by using figures 
for primate city populations that were projections that, when census data became 
available, proved to be too high. To give just one example, consider the paper by 
Alberto Ades and Edward Glaeser published in 1995, which seeks to explain the 
apparently high concentration of nations’ urban populations in a single city (Ades and 
Glaeser 1995). This is an influential paper and one that is widely quoted. Many of the 
city population figures used in this paper are estimates in the absence of any census 
data, or projections from data from censuses held many years previously. When census 
data became available to provide a more reliable base for population figures, many 
cities included in the Ades and Glaeser analysis had populations that were much smaller 
than the figures that had been used. This analysis also took no account of the differences 
in the criteria used by nations to define their urban population, even though this 
obviously influences any measure of primacy when the population of each nation’s 
‘largest city’, or a set of the largest cities, is divided by the urban population. It also 
took no account of the different criteria used to set the boundaries within which city 
populations are measured. The validity of the data used in the Ades and Glaeser paper 
on the political structure of nations could also be questioned; this is one among many 
papers that have sought to analyse associations between urban structures and political 
structures for a wide range of low- and middle-income nations. The paper claims that 
there is a robust causality between dictatorships and urban concentration. This is 
puzzling, in that there are so many examples within the last 60 years of non-democratic 
governments strongly controlling people’s movement to urban areas, including the 
largest cities – and including many of the colonial regimes in Africa. There are also the 
examples of non-democratic governments that strongly controlled rural to urban 
migration and limited urban concentration – including China for the 1960s and 1970s, 
and South Africa until the apartheid laws were no longer applied. There is also the issue 
that any nation’s largest city and urban system has within it the influence of a long 
history of political (and economic and demographic) change, and many nations that 
would have been classified as having dictatorial political structures in the late 1970s or 
early 1980s also had long periods of democratic governments prior to this. For instance, 
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay always figure prominently among the most primate-city 
dominated nations. However, this cannot be ascribed to the non-democratic 
governments they had for parts of the 1970s and 1980s, because each of these countries 
had long periods of democratic government before this. We need far more detailed 
national analyses of urban change that discuss the underlying economic, political, 
social, and demographic changes (Bryceson and Potts 2006; Hasan 2006) before we 
seek generalizations that can be applied to regions or to all low- and middle-income 
nations.  
5.5  Data limitations distorting urban policies 
This paper has concentrated on the limitations in the data on urban and city populations. 
There are many other areas where the absence of basic data means the validity of urban 
statistics can be questioned. For instance, most of the urban poverty statistics for Africa 
and Asia are derived from poverty lines set with no data on the actual cost of non-food 
necessities and with very inadequate allowances for non-food expenditures, because of 
which they understate both the extent and the depth of urban poverty (Satterthwaite 
2004). The lack of accurate data also helps explain some magnificently inaccurate 
figures given for the extent of urban poverty. For example, a paper published in 2003   12
suggested that there was virtually no urban poverty in many sub-Saharan African 
nations (Sahn and Stifel 2003). The application of the US$1 a day poverty line to urban 
populations also produces nonsensical statistics in cities or urban populations where the 
cost of non-food necessities is high. This is both within successful cities and in urban 
centres where urban poor groups pay high prices for schools, health care, transport and 
access to water and sanitation because of the inadequacies in public provision, and high 
prices for housing because of constraints on land supplies for housing. The use of this 
US$1 a day poverty line is worrying, in that this is being used as one of the main 
indicators to assess progress in meeting the MDGs. Applying the US$1 a day poverty 
line means that, by 2002, there was apparently virtually no urban poverty in China, 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (Ravallion et al. 
2007).
8 The deficiencies in the official UN statistics on provision for water and 
sanitation in urban areas has been documented and discussed elsewhere (UN-HABITAT 
2003); the problem is mainly in misinterpretation by those using the statistics. This 
means that the proportion of the urban population with good quality or ‘safe and 
sufficient’ provision for water and sanitation is greatly overstated. Official UN statistics 
cannot be used to monitor MDG progress on provision for water because they do not 
measure who has ‘access to safe water’ (UN-HABITAT 2003). 
Another factor is the paucity of data on urban populations for key social or health 
issues. Most available data are drawn from national sample surveys (for instance, the 
demographic and health surveys) that have sample sizes too small to provide data for 
individual urban centres (except, perhaps, for the largest city) or to allow much 
disaggregation. This means that there is little or no data on, say, infant, child, and 
maternal mortality rates among low-income urban populations. There is also the issue of 
how little data these surveys collect on housing and living conditions. One also wonders 
whether the data gatherers for the national surveys actually gather data from those living 
in informal settlements, either because there is no map or no data on populations in 
these settlements, or because those collecting the data are frightened to enter these 
settlements. However, informal settlements house a large part of the urban population in 
most low- and middle-income nations. 
In addition, the validity of discussing conditions and trends for the urban population of 
any nation has to be questioned, given the diversity of urban centres within most 
nations. For instance, there are very few studies of conditions in urban centres with less 
than 50,000 inhabitants yet many nations have a fifth or more of their national 
population living in these (Satterthwaite 2006). There is little in common between small 
market towns in areas with stagnant economies in (say) Argentina, China and India and 
Buenos Aires, Shanghai and Delhi. 
There is an important new area where lack of data is driving inappropriate policy 
responses. This is the lack of data on greenhouse gas emissions for urban centres in 
Africa and Asia. This has led to assumptions that these urban centres have high levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions, which then underpin more attention by international agencies 
to greenhouse gas emission reduction (mitigation) rather than to protecting these urban 
                                                 
8 Applying this US$1 a day poverty line, they suggest that less than 1 per cent of the urban population of 
China, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East are poor. This paper seems to 
regard these measures as valid. See Solinger (2006) for a discussion of the real scale and depth of urban 
poverty in China.    13
centres’ populations from the often very serious risks they face from climate change 
(adaptation). More generally, there is also the issue of cities being blamed for global 
warming – for instance, through the widely used but inaccurate statistic that cities emit 
75 to 80 per cent of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, when they probably 
emit substantially less than half of all such emissions (Satterthwaite 2008). 
Our understanding of urbanization in Europe over the last 250 years is driven by a 
relatively weak and incomplete set of statistics on levels of urbanization and city 
populations; it is, though, underpinned by a rich information base on social, economic, 
political and demographic history. By contrast, today, we have what appears to be a 
complete set of statistics for all nations and territories for their level of urbanization, and 
for the population of capitals and large cities from 1950 to the present; however, these 
are so often interpreted with no knowledge of the social, economic, political and 
demographic underpinnings of urban change. The world’s largest cities, or its fastest or 
slowest growing large cities, or the nations with the most rapid urbanization can be 
listed and compared, independent of any knowledge of these cities or nations, or of the 
limitations in the data about them. This needs to change. 
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